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Samantha Halliday, Associate Professor, University of Leeds. 
Protecting human dignity: reframing the abortion debate to respect the dignity of 
choice and life 
Introduction 
Pregnancy is a unique state, involving as it does two distinct entities within one body.  
Throughout pregnancy the foetus is entirely dependent upon the pregnant woman and her 
actions and choices, such as the choice to drink excessive alcohol or smoke, may impact 
negatively upon the foetus.  By the same token, pregnancy, whether or not it continues to 
term and culminates in a live birth, will inevitably change the life of the woman concerned, 
both physically and emotionally.  In recent years the courts and the legislature in England and 
Wales have considered the nature of pregnancy and the pregnant woman’s responsibilities in 
a number of contexts.  Thus, for example, whilst the courts have failed to recognise that 
either the pregnant woman has a right to autonomy, or that the foetus has a right to life, they 
have nonetheless been prepared to recognise that a pregnant woman must be given full 
information about delivery methods and their risks,1 that the right to conscientious objection 
must be narrowly construed in order to not constrain access to abortion,2 that a women may 
be subjected to a caesarean against her wishes where she lacks the capacity to decide for 
herself and such an intervention furthers her best interests;3 and that the foetus cannot be a 
victim of poisoning for the purposes of an award of criminal injuries compensation when the 
child, once born, suffers from foetal alcohol spectrum disorder due to its mother’s excessive 
consumption of alcohol during pregnancy.4  In Parliament a number of attempts have been 
made to amend the Abortion Act 1967, notably to introduce independent counselling5 and to 
prohibit gender based abortion.6  Ostensibly these proposals have not been made for the 
purpose of protecting the foetus, but in the name of protecting women from making an ill-
informed, unwise, or even a coerced decision. 
Although reproductive decision-making is deeply personal, it is regulated in a way that other 
health and life choices are not.  To some extent this reflects the public interest in the foetus, 
but the regulation of women during pregnancy, and of their decision-making, can be only 
partly explained on this basis.  In the recent cases of court authorised obstetric intervention 
concerning women with a mental disorder, or a learning difficulty, courts have demonstrated 
an astonishing willingness to find that a caesarean delivery is required by the woman’s best 
interests, with the primary component of those best interests being the achievement of the 
safe delivery of the ‘child.’7  In many of those cases there has been a noticeable lack of 
support intended to facilitate the woman making delivery choices for herself, despite the fact 
that the Mental Capacity Act requires use to be made of supported decision-making (s.4(4) 
                                                 
1 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430. 
2 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Wood [2014] UKSC 68, [2015] AC 640. 
3 Re AA (Mental Capacity: Enforced Caesarean) [2012] EWHC 4378 (COP), [2014] 2 FLR 237; Re P  [2013] 
EWHC 4581 (COP); Great Western Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v AA, BB, CC & DD [2014] EWHC 132 
(Fam); Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust v AB (unreported, 31 January 2014); The Mental Health Trust, The 
Acute Trust & The Council v DD & BC [2014] EWCOP 11 (COP). 
4 CP (A Child) v First-Tier Tribunal (Criminal Injuries Compensation) & Others [2014] EWCA Civ 1554, 
[2015] 1 QB 459. 
5 Proposed amendment to the Health and Social Care Bill, 2011, Nadine Dorries MP. 
6 Abortion (Sex-Selection) Ten Minute Rule Bill, 2014, and proposed amendment to the Serious Crime Bill, 
2015, Fiona Bruce MP. 
7 See for example Re AA (note 3), per Mostyn J at 239; Re P (note 3), per Peter Jackson J at [17]; The Mental 
Health Trust, The Acute Trust & The Council v DD & BC (note 3), at [97]. 
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MCA 2005), obligating the person determining the best interests to permit and encourage the 
individual concerned to participate, or to improve her ability to participate as fully as 
possible.  By contrast the proposed women protective amendments to abortion law stress the 
need to support women in reaching a decision about abortion, not to support her decision, but 
to influence the way in which she makes it, to ensure that she will not regret her decision.  
Thus narratives of regret and guilt, and the need to protect women from such self-induced 
states, as well more generally from making an unwise, or irresponsible decision, dominate the 
jurisprudence of court authorised obstetric intervention and the political discourse about the 
regulation of abortion. This article focuses upon one of the proposed woman-protective 
amendments to the Abortion Act 1967, the proposed introduction of a requirement that 
women be offered independent counselling, arguing that the way in which a pregnant 
woman’s decision-making, and indeed pregnant women themselves, are regulated is in need 
of reform.8  It sets out an alternative framework for viewing and regulating this unique 
biological state, where the woman effectively becomes a living matryoshka with another 
entity inside her own body, namely by reference to the protection of human dignity.  
There is considerable support for the principle of human dignity at both a national and an 
international level, however there is no consensus upon the meaning of dignity, even at a 
national level.  As discussed below, the concept of dignity is capable of multiple meanings – 
it can be seen to constrain choice, as for example in the French dwarf throwing case,9 whilst 
also being seen to support the free exercise of autonomy.  It may be restricted in its 
application to persons extant, or may apply both prenatally to the foetus,10 or even after death 
to the extent that it protects the bodily integrity and even the reputation of the deceased.11 In 
this article I review one of the recent challenges to abortion law and consider how dignity 
may be utilised to bolster both the woman’s autonomy, but also to ensure that the dignity of 
prenatal life is respected.  In doing so I will draw comparatively upon caselaw from Germany 
and the United States of America, considering the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court and 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) have constructed  
human dignity in the abortion context, whilst recognising that some important cultural and 
political distinctions exist between the three jurisdictions.  Ultimately it will be argued that 
reproductive exceptionalism must end and that restrictions upon reproductive decision-
making should be viewed as impacting upon the woman’s dignity.  It is not simply a question 
of whether a woman has a right to access abortion, or indeed a duty to have a caesarean, but 
rather a broader view of the protection that dignity demands during pregnancy should be 
taken.  Therefore, I argue that rather than focussing upon a right to elect an abortion, more 
emphasis is needed upon supporting the pregnant woman throughout pregnancy, upon 
respecting human dignity.  Reframing the debate about reproductive decision-making in this 
manner will demand that her autonomous choices are respected, but also require that her 
autonomy be fostered/promoted and that she is enabled to participate in decision-making to 
the greatest extent possible. 
 A1.  The guarantee of human dignity – a universal principle 
The principle of human dignity has come to play an increasingly important role in the context 
of medical ethics and the law.  At the supranational level, recognition of the inalienable right 
to human dignity and guarantees to protect it can be found in instruments including the 
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of the recent court authorised obstetric cases see S. Halliday Autonomy and Pregnancy: 
A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention, London: Routledge, 2016, chapter 2. 
9 Conseil d’Etat, Ass., 27 October 1995, Cne de Morsang-sur-Orge, Dalloz Jur. 1995, p. 257. 
10 BVerfGE 39, 1; BVerfGE 88, 203; Vo v France (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 12. 
11 See for example the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Mephisto decision, BVerfGE 30, 173. 
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United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights,12 the Convention of the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,13 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights14 and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine.15  Although the protection of human dignity is not explicitly mentioned in the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court’s jurisprudence leaves no doubt 
that dignity is protected under the Convention, indeed as the court held in S.W. v The United 
Kingdom, the essence of the convention is ‘respect for human dignity and human freedom,’16 
it is the central premise upon which the convention is built.  Moreover, Art. 2 Lisbon Treaty 
emphasises the preeminent importance of dignity in EU law, stating ‘The Union is founded 
on the [value] of respect for human dignity.’  
 
At a national level such provisions guaranteeing human dignity can be found in constitutions, 
normally at the start, emphasising the centrality of the principle to the constitutional order; a 
prime example can be seen in the German constitution (the Grundgesetz, Basic Law): Art. 1 I 
GG states ‘The dignity of human beings is inviolable.  All state authority is under a duty to 
respect and protect it.’17  This article guarantees the protection of human dignity in a 
provision that is little more than a statement affirming the dignity of human beings, without 
attempting to elucidate the meaning of human dignity, or indeed the beneficiaries of the 
guarantee.  Nevertheless, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional 
Court) has described Art. 1 I GG as the ‘supreme value in the Grundgesetz,’18 and it is 
probably best regarded as the preamble to the constitution itself and the lens through which 
the basic rights protected by the constitution (set out in Art.s 2 – 19 GG) should be viewed.  
As will be discussed below, the guaranteed protection of human dignity has played a pivotal 
role in the abortion jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, requiring that foetal life 
be protected from implantation, but simultaneously demanding respect for the woman’s right 
to self-determination and bodily integrity.19  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of any similar provision, in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America references to human dignity can increasingly be seen in the case law and 
legislative debates, in relation to such disparate topics as the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment and the right to marry for same-sex couples.20  The courts in both 
jurisdictions have made reference to the principle, and indeed sought to uphold it, in a 
number of spheres of life.  Thus, for example, in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, Baroness Hale 
relied upon the concept of dignity in finding that s. 2(2) Rent Act 1977 should be interpreted 
to comply with the Convention, so that the defendant could succeed to the tenancy of his 
longstanding male partner.21  She emphasised that: 
Democracy is founded on the principle that each individual has equal value.  Treating 
some as automatically having less value than others not only causes pain and distress 
to that person but also violates his or her dignity as a human being.  The essence of 
                                                 
12 Preamble, Art.s 1, 22, 23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
13 Premable Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
14 Preamble, Art. 10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
15 Preamble, Art. 1 Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
16 22 Nov. 1995, 47/1994/494/576, at para 44. 
17 Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own. 
18 BVerfGE 6, 32, at 41. 
19 BVerfGE 39, 1; 88, 203. 
20 See for example the second reading of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, 
col 980 ff. 
21 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, per Baroness Hale, at [132]. 
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the Convention, as has often been said, is respect for human dignity and human 
freedom.’22   
 
Similarly in Roper v Simmons,23 holding the death penalty to be unconstitutional in the case 
of minors, Kennedy J referred to ‘the broad provisions to secure individual freedom and 
preserve human dignity’ in the U.S. constitution, arguing that ‘These doctrines and 
guarantees are central to the American experience and remain essential to our present-day 
self-definition and national identity.’24   
 
2. Competing conceptions of dignity 
 
Notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision asserting the protection of human 
dignity, the European Court of Human Rights and courts on both sides of the Atlantic have 
accepted that the protection of human dignity forms a core principle within the law.  
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on what the protection of human dignity requires.  The 
concept of dignity is capable of bearing multiple meanings and, recognising that it can be 
used as both a sword and a shield, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword offer two 
competing constructions of dignity, namely dignity as empowerment and dignity as 
constraint.25    Conceptualising dignity as empowerment recognises the manner in which it 
can be used to support choice, to reinforce autonomy.  It is this construction of dignity that 
has enjoyed significant success in the context of end of life decision-making where it has 
been utilised by those seeking to promote assisted dying as a more publicly acceptable 
synonym for autonomy.  Thus reference is made to ‘dignity in dying’ based upon compassion 
and choice, indeed the titles given to the American assisted dying Acts (the ‘Death with 
Dignity Acts’ of Oregon and Washington, and Vermont’s ‘Patient Choice at the End of Life 
Act’) demonstrate the key role now attributed to dignity as a vehicle for choice.26  Significant 
progress has been made by those seeking to legalise assisted dying in the United States of 
America by reframing the issue as a right to die with dignity, rather than a right to euthanasia. 
 
Jeremy Waldren has argued that ‘dignity has to function as a normative idea: it is the idea of 
a certain status that ought to be accredited to all persons and taken seriously in the way they 
are ruled.’27  Such a construction of dignity would be consistent with Deryck Beyleveld and 
Roger Brownsword’s concept of dignity as constraint.  It provides a symbolic expression of 
the inherent value of human life and requires that all life be treated with respect, but not that 
life be preserved in all circumstances.  In Germany at least, dignity has been held to impose a 
duty upon the state to protect prenatal life; in its first abortion decision the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht emphasised that ‘Where human life exists, human dignity is 
present; whether the bearer is aware of this dignity and knows how to preserve it himself is 
not decisive. The potential capabilities present from the beginning of human existence suffice 
to establish human dignity.’28  Thus by endowing prenatal life with dignity, the woman’s 
autonomy may be constrained, reflecting the communitarian nature of dignity.  As Christian 
Starck explains, ‘Human dignity does not mean unlimited self-determination, but self-
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 125 S Ct 1183 (2005). 
24 Ibid, at 1200. 
25 D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Oxford: OUP, 2001. 
26 S. Halliday ‘Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: A plea for a more European 
approach’ (2013) 13 Medical Law International 135, at 141. 
27 J. Waldron ‘How Law Protects Dignity’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 200, at 202. 
28 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 41. 
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determination which is exercised on the basis that everyone – not simply the person claiming 
the right to self-determination—is of value in his or her own right.’29 
 
Dignity does not however merely require that all life be valued and protected, it also 
incorporates an element of equal treatment.  Both Jeremy Waldren and James Whitman have 
argued that dignity has occasioned a ‘levelling up’, requiring that the degree of respect and 
level of treatment previously only accorded to nobility be afforded to all persons,30  and 
Baroness Hale certainly gave voice to this argument in Ghaidan.31 In the reproductive 
context, whilst the foetus has benefitted from such levelling up, it is suggested that pregnant 
women have had no such boost in relation to their perceived decisional capacity.  As Ann 
Oakley explained, the overwhelming view that emerged from her study of the medical care of 
pregnant women was that ‘pregnant women were themselves deficient: they lacked the 
necessary intelligence, foresight, education, or responsibility to see that the only proper 
pathway to successful motherhood was the one repeatedly surveyed by medical expertise.’32  
Whilst Oakley’s study was conducted during the early 1980s, the inability of women to make 
reproductive decisions without guidance continues to dominate the discourse. As will be 
considered below, women’s decision-making is subject to supervision and amendment and is 
treated as suspect and incompetent wherever it is inconsistent with the idealised standards of 
maternity.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognised the synthesis of dignity with autonomy in 
Pretty,33 but the courts in England and Wales have also placed reliance upon ‘dignity’ in 
cases where the individual concerned lacks the ability to make an autonomous choice.  As 
Munby J emphasised in Burke,34 ‘It is not just the sentient or self-conscious who have dignity 
interests protected by the law.’  In cases where the individual is incapable of making a choice 
(either contemporaneously, or through the implementation of an anticipatory decision) 
dignity can clearly not operate as empowerment, however the courts regularly refer to the 
notion that an individual lacking capacity to decide for herself should be permitted to ‘die 
with dignity.’  Acknowledging this, Munby J stressed:  
The invocation of the dignity of the patient in the form of a declaration habitually 
used when the court is exercising its inherent declaratory jurisdiction in relation to the 
gravely ill or dying is not some meaningless incantation designed to comfort the 
living or to assuage the consciences of those involved in making life and death 
decisions: it is a solemn affirmation of the law's and of society's recognition of our 
humanity and of human dignity as something fundamental.35   
 
There is a significant difference between a court granting a declaration that treatment may be 
withheld, or withdrawn, to allow a patient lacking capacity to die with dignity, and respecting 
                                                 
29 C. Starck, ‘The Religious and Philosophical Background of Human Dignity and its Place in Modern 
Constitutions,’ in D.Kretzmer and E. Klein (eds) The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, 179, at 181. 
30 See for example J. Waldron, ‘Dignity and Rank: In Memory of Gregory Vlastos’ (2007) 2   Archives 
Européennes de Sociologie  201, at  215 ff; J. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening 
Divide Between America and Europe, Oxford:OUP, 2003. 
31 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza (note 21), at [132]. 
32 A. Oakley, The Captured Womb: a History of the Medical Care of Pregnant Women, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984, at 72. 
33 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, at [65]. 
34 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin); [2005] QB 424, at [58]. 
35 R (A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex CC and the Disability Rights Commission (No 2) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin), 
(2003) 6 CCLR 194, at [86]. 
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a patient’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment as in the case of Ms B.36  Whilst the latter may 
properly be characterised as dignity as empowerment, the former demonstrates the 
conceptualisation of dignity as constraint, restraining healthcare professionals from 
prolonging life (or as the Law Lord’s referred to Antony Bland’s state, his existence37) for the 
sake of life.  As Lord Hoffmann made clear in Bland autonomy and dignity may be 
complementary, rather than synonymous:  
In my view the choice which the law makes must reassure people that the courts do 
have full respect for life, but that they do not pursue the principle to the point at which 
it has become almost empty of any real content and when it involves the sacrifice of 
other important values such as human dignity and freedom of choice.38 
Thus the courts have stressed that the protection of human dignity may override the 
importance of the sanctity of life, even where the patient has not made any choice concerning 
(non)treatment as in the case of Bland.  In this construction of dignity as constraint, stress is 
laid not upon personal choice, but upon the inherent dignity of life, emphasising the distance 
between human dignity (where the life must be perceived as having some value, to the 
individual or at an abstract level) and the sanctity of life. Thus although the guarantee of 
human dignity expresses respect for life, it will not always require the preservation of a 
specific life, particularly where so doing would significantly impact upon the dignity and 
rights of another, a key consideration in the context of reproductive decision-making. 
 
3. Dignity in the reproductive context 
 
The tension between the multiple and often competing conceptions of dignity is particularly 
apparent in the reproductive context where human dignity may require the protection of both 
the woman’s rights to bodily integrity and self-determination, as well as the protection of 
foetal life.  Although the English courts have not recognised that the foetus has a right to life, 
or that the pregnant woman has a right to autonomy in respect of choosing an abortion at any 
stage of the pregnancy,39 a number of superior courts have addressed these rights by 
reference to human dignity.  For example, the Hungarian Constitutional Court found that 
dignity was engaged in the regulation of abortion, holding: ‘Among the rights to be weighed 
against the state’s duty to give increased protection to foetal life, the mother’s right to self-
determination – as part of the right to human dignity – is the most important one.’40  By 
contrast the Bundesverfassungsgericht found that the regulation of abortion impacts upon 
both the dignity of the pregnant woman and foetal life and was significantly less inclined to 
prioritise the woman’s right to self-determination as will be considered below. 
 
Emphasising the conceptualisation of dignity as liberty, Joseph Raz wrote ‘Respecting human 
dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus 
respecting people’s dignity includes respecting their autonomy, their right to control their 
future.’41  This formulation echoes that adopted by Wilson J in R v Morgentaler where she 
                                                 
36 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
37 See for example Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 856, per Lord Keith. 
38 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 830. 
39 Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] QB 276, per George Baker P, at 279. 
40 Decision 48/1998 (IX.23) AB, para 3(b), quoted in C. McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights,’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 655, at 689.   For an excellent comparison of the use of 
dignity in relation to abortion by the German and Hungarian constitutional courts see C. Dupré, Importing the 
Law in Post- communist Transitions: The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity, 
Oxford: Hart, 2003. 
41 J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 2009, at 221. 
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stressed that human dignity underpins the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms42 and 
that ‘the right to reproduce or not to reproduce … is properly perceived as an integral part of 
modern woman's struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human being.’43  She 
emphasised that the limitations upon access to abortion imposed by s. 251 Criminal Code 
undermined not only a woman’s autonomy, but also her bodily integrity, that the pregnant 
woman ‘is truly being treated as a means - a means to an end which she does not desire but 
over which she has no control. She is the passive recipient of a decision made by others as to 
whether her body is to be used to nurture a new life. Can there be anything that comports less 
with human dignity and self-respect?’44  Thus conceived dignity is more broadly defined than 
autonomy, it encompasses the right to bodily integrity and reflects Immanuel Kant’s second 
categorical imperative, the principle that persons should not be instrumentalised, that they 
should be an end in themselves, and not a means to an end.45  
 
The synthesis of dignity with autonomy is clearly evident in the American abortion 
jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court has relied upon the concept of dignity to reject 
limitations upon the woman’s right to choose an abortion prior to viability.  Writing for the 
majority in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, O’Connor J 
expressed this notion in the following terms: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.46 
 
The plurality’s formulation of dignity, based upon autonomy and the construction of 
personhood through choices, had the effect of empowering women, reinforcing a pregnant 
woman’s claim to self-determination.  Similarly, Stevens J, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, stated, ‘The authority to make such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an 
element of basic human dignity. As the joint opinion so eloquently demonstrates, a woman's 
decision to terminate her pregnancy is nothing less than a matter of conscience.’47 
 
Thus in Casey the Supreme Court adopted a conception of dignity that focussed upon 
personal choice and recognising women’s agency.  However, the limits of that personal 
choice are particularly clear in the American context, where the right to elect a pre-viability 
abortion must be distinguished from the question of a woman’s ability to access abortion.  As 
the Supreme Court has made clear on a number of occasions, there is no requirement that 
states facilitate access to abortion.48  Moreover, as the plurality recognised in Casey, a 
woman is entitled to make the ultimate decision to have an abortion, but the state can seek to 
manage, or influence that decision provided that in so doing it does not impose an undue 
burden upon her ability to elect a pre-viability abortion.49  For example, in that case the 
                                                 
42 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, Canadian Supreme Court, Wilson J (concurring), at 165ff 
43 Ibid, at 172. 
44 Ibid at 173. 
45 I. Kant, ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,’ in J. Timmermann (ed), Sammlung Philosophie, 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004, vol. 3, at 44, Rn. 49. 
46 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al v Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992), at 851. 
47 Ibid, at 916. 
48 See for example Harris v McRae 448 US 297 (1980); Rust v Sullivan 500 US 173 (1991); Webster v 
Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
49 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al v Casey (note 46), at 877. 
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plurality upheld the Pennsylvanian measures such as an informed consent requirement 
whereby the woman’s consent will only be considered voluntary and informed if at least 24 
hours before the abortion was performed the doctor had provided information about the 
nature and health risks of the abortion procedure and childbirth, told her the probable 
gestational age of the foetus and informed her of the availability of printed materials from the 
state describing the foetus and providing information about alternatives to abortion (including 
adoption) and the availability of financial assistance available for medical care during 
pregnancy and childbirth.  The plurality stressed that this requirement does not impose an 
undue burden upon the woman’s right to elect a pre-viability abortion noting that ‘the right 
protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by 
the state. Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right, 
it cannot be classified as an interference with …[or] an undue burden on that right.’50 Of 
course complying with such an informed consent requirement will delay the performance of 
an abortion, requiring two separate visits to the abortion clinic and thereby subjecting women 
to running the gauntlet of abortion protesters at least twice, increasing the cost of abortion 
(particularly if the woman has to travel a long distance to access abortion) and requiring her 
to take more time off work or from her other commitments.  Nevertheless, the court 
considered that these factors would not render the mandatory waiting period and informed 
consent requirement an undue burden upon her ability to choose an abortion and therefore 
upheld the requirement.51 Thus considered, the negative aspect of the woman’s right to 
choose abortion is evident – practical restrictions upon her ability to exercise that right render 
it illusionary for those of limited means. 
 
The construction of dignity as empowerment is subjective, prioritising individual values, 
rather than seeking to establish a universal human dignity.  However, as Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword recognise, dignity can also operate to deny individual choice when 
constructed as constraint. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a very different interpretation of 
dignity in Gonzales v Carhart52  where it upheld the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act.  Having 
provided an extremely graphic and emotive description of how a so-called ‘partial birth’ 
abortion is performed, the majority of the Supreme Court recognised that dignity is engaged 
in relation to the foetus’ life as well as the woman’s choices.  Thus, upholding the 
constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act Kennedy J stated that it ‘expresses 
respect for the dignity of human life.’53  Unfortunately, he failed to develop his analysis of 
dignity as life and gave no explicit consideration to the dignity of the pregnant woman.  
Kennedy J emphasised the need for a woman’s decision to abort to be fully informed, the 
purpose of the information being to protect women from the seemingly inevitable regret that 
some women will feel after choosing to undergo an abortion.54 However, as Reva Siegel 
argues, the suggestion that women should be protected from making a decision that they will 
later regret is a very different view to the conception of dignity as equality and autonomy set 
out in Casey.55 Given that the Act contains no exception safeguarding the health of the 
woman, it is suggested that Kennedy’s understanding of dignity can at best be characterised 
as one-sided.  Moreover, the conclusion that the Act expresses respect for the dignity of 
human life is somewhat surprising when one considers that the legislation prohibits a 
                                                 
50 Ibid, at 887. 
51 At 885ff. 
52 127 S.Ct. 1610, at 1633 (2007). 
53 Ibid, at 1633 
54 Ibid at 1634. 
55 R.B. Siegel ‘Dignity and sexuality: Claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and same-sex 
marriage’ (2012) 10 (2) I.Con 355, at 368. 
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particular method of procuring an abortion, rather than the termination of pregnancy itself, 
suggesting that the respect expressed is extremely limited in nature.  Indeed, given that the 
focus of the prohibition is upon the method utilised to procure an abortion, the only constraint 
would appear to be upon medical practice.  
 
4. The German compromise: the protection of dignity, life and liberty interests in 
the regulation of abortion 
 
Whilst the U.S. Supreme Court and the Hungarian Constitutional Court have primarily 
adopted a conception of dignity focused upon choice and recognising a woman’s agency in 
relation to abortion, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht linked the protection of human 
dignity to both the woman’s right to self-determination and the foetal right to life, 
conceptualising dignity as both liberty (in the sense of decisional autonomy promoted in 
Casey) and constraint, in so far as it requires the woman’s liberty interests to be restrained in 
order to protect the foetus.  The court has twice found abortion legislation to be 
unconstitutional and thus invalid, in decisions handed down shortly after the U.S Supreme 
Court decided Roe and Casey.56  Despite the proximity in time, the German decisions differ 
significantly from their U.S. counterparts, holding that the constitutional guarantee of human 
dignity, and the right to life, apply to the foetus in and of itself.57   
 
The right to life is guaranteed by Art. 2 II s.1 GG, protecting the physical-biological existence 
of human beings.58 Unlike the Irish constitution59 the German constitution does not expressly 
state that the right to life applies to prenatal life, but the legislative history of the Grundgesetz 
demonstrates that the legislature intended the right to life to apply prior to birth60 and the 
judges in each of the abortion decisions were unanimous in holding that the right to life is not 
limited to life extant, stating ‘The protection of human existence from state interference 
would be incomplete if it did not include the preliminary stage of “completed life,” prenatal 
life.’61  Indeed, as Rupp-v.-Brünneck and Simon JJ point out in their dissenting opinion, the 
question is not whether, but how the right applies to the foetus.62 Although the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that the pregnant woman’s rights to life and bodily 
integrity, to personality and her dignity are engaged, it held that she owes a duty to her foetus 
throughout pregnancy, a duty to continue the pregnancy to full term.63  That being the case, 
her rights must be curtailed to the extent necessary to protect the foetus, unless her choice to 
terminate the pregnancy can be justified.  As the court stressed, in all but the most serious 
situations a woman’s failure to continue the pregnancy will not be capable of justification and 
thus must be categorised as unlawful.64   
                                                 
56 BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); 88, 203 (1993). 
57 Abortion I: BVerfGE 39, 1, at 1, headnote 1; Abortion II: BVerfGE 88, 203, at 252. Cf Roe v Wade 410 US 
113 (1973), per Blackmun J at 158. 
58 H. Schulze-Fielitz, in H. Dreier, Grundgesetz Kommentar, 2nd edn, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004 Art. 2 II, 
Rn. 25. 
59 Art. 40.3.3° Irish constitution states ‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to defend and vindicate that right. …’.  Noticeably the only conflicting right relevant in the Irish context is 
the woman’s own right to life, her right to self-determination cannot be weighed against the foetal right to life, 
Attorney General  v X [1992] ILRM 401.   
60 For a comprehensive account of the parliamentary debates see R.Beckmann, ‘Der Parlamentarische Rat und 
das “keimende Leben”’ (2008) 47(4) Der Staat 551. 
61 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 37. 
62 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 68.  
63 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 44; 88, 203, at 253. 
64 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 48ff; 88, 203, at 255ff.. 
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A fundamental difference in approach in the American and German constitutional 
philosophies can be readily discerned in the abortion jurisprudence.  The U.S Supreme Court 
recognised that the state had an interest in prenatal life and that it could (should it so choose) 
intervene to protect that interest from the beginning of the third trimester (in Roe), or 
throughout pregnancy provided that in doing so the state did not pose an undue burden upon 
the woman’s right to elect a previability abortion (in Casey).  By contrast, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the foetus is protected by both the right to life and the 
constitutional guarantee of human dignity and that the state is under a duty to take positive 
action to protect foetal life from implantation onwards.  It stated ‘The state’s duty to protect 
is comprehensive.  Self-evidently it does not only prohibit direct state interference in the 
developing life, but also requires the state to take a stance protecting and promoting this life, 
… above all, to protect it from unlawful interference from others.’65 Therefore, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that the state has an affirmative duty to protect and 
promote foetal life, including protecting the foetus from the pregnant woman herself.66   
  
Thus, two years after the U.S. Supreme Court had emphasised the liberty of the individual 
and the limits of state action infringing upon the exercise of that liberty in Casey, the German 
court stressed the communitarian nature of rights, emphasising that pregnancy involves a 
‘Zweiheit in Einheit’ (duality in unity), rather than merely a pregnant woman and underlining 
the social and relational aspects of pregnancy.67  Whilst the U.S Supreme Court found that 
the foetus is not a person within the meaning of the constitution,68 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that the right to life applies to prenatal life, holding that 
the foetus is an independent legally protected value (Rechtsgut) that ‘does not develop into a 
human being, but as a human being.’69 In seeking to reconcile the conflicting rights of the 
woman and the duty to protect foetal life, the court attributed a pivotal role to the protection 
of human dignity, holding in Abortion I that in weighing the conflicting constitutional values 
reference must be made to their relationship with the protection of human dignity, the 
epicentre of the constitutional value system.70  Nevertheless, the court adopted a very one-
dimensional view of dignity in the first decision, adopting the formulation of dignity as 
restraint by stressing that the protection of dignity requires the protection of human life, and 
that such protection will outweigh the woman’s right to self-determination throughout the 
pregnancy.71  It failed to consider the impact of dignity on the weight to be accorded to her 
right to self-determination.  In Abortion II the Bundesverfassungsgericht emphasised the link 
between human dignity and the consequent duty to protect foetal life,72 stressing that ‘where 
human life exists, human dignity is accorded to it.’73  The court described the right to life ‘as 
the most elementary and inalienable right derived from human dignity,’74 and emphasised 
                                                 
65 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 42. 
66 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 42; 88, 203, at 255. 
67 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 253; cf. BVerfGE 39, 1 at 42 stressing the separateness of the foetus and the pregnant 
woman. For an interesting analysis of the juxtaposition between the communitarian and individualist stances of 
the two courts see C. McCrudden (note 40). 
68 Roe v Wade (note 57), at 157. 
69 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 252; 39, 1, at 37. 
70 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 43, citing BVerfGE 35, 202, at 225. 
71 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 43. 
72 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 251ff.  In Abortion II the court held that the protection of human dignity was the source 
of the state’s duty to protect foetal life, with the measure of that protection being derived from Art. 2 II GG, this 
is an important shift from the position it took in Abortion I, where the protection of human dignity was viewed 
as a parallel source of support for the state’s duty, BVerfGE 39,1, at 51. 
73 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 252. 
74 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 252. 
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that ‘The duty to protect prenatal life is based upon individual life, not just on human life in 
general. Compliance [with the duty] is a fundamental condition of orderly cohabitation in the 
state.’75  The court’s finding that the foetus benefits from the guarantee of human dignity 
remains controversial, not least because it failed to explain why the existence of prenatal life 
will in and of itself will automatically engage the protection of human dignity. As Horst 
Dreier argues ‘Life is the condition sine qua non not the sine per quam for the applicability of 
Art. 1 I GG.’76  Nevertheless, it is suggested that Jörn Ipsen is correct to argue that the foetus 
is protected by the guarantee of human dignity operating as an objective fundamental 
constitutional principle, rather than at a subjective level, with the foetus a designated holder 
of human dignity.77  In this manner the foetus’ prospective dignity interest can be protected, 
without endowing the foetus with rights.   
 
The German constitution expressly recognises that the right to life is not absolute,78 but 
human dignity is guaranteed as inviolable (unantastbar), it is an absolute value, the 
infringement of which cannot be justified in any circumstance.79 If dignity is construed as 
life, it constitutes a trump card80 for those seeking to prohibit abortion, but the termination of 
pregnancy per se is not necessarily contrary to human dignity, rather in order to establish a 
breach of Art. 1 I GG, it must be demonstrated that the extinguishing of foetal life is contrary 
to human dignity in the context in which it takes place.  For example, gender-based abortion 
for the purpose of family balancing rather than on medical grounds, could be found to be 
contrary to human dignity, but it is the motivating factor, rather than the termination of foetal 
life, that makes it so.81  It is submitted that in recognising the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship between the right to life and the guarantee of human dignity, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht underlined the significance of the right to life within the hierarchy 
of fundamental rights and the need for restraint in abrogating that right,82 it also broadened 
the scope of available protection substantially, permitting itself significantly more leeway to 
determine that the abortion legislation in question was unconstitutional.   
 
In both decisions the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the foetus is protected by the 
guarantee of human dignity and adopted a duty driven conception of dignity, imposing a duty 
to protect foetal life upon the state and a duty to carry the pregnancy to term upon the 
woman.  Inevitably this formulation of the state’s protective duty will prioritise the protection 
of foetal life over the woman’s liberty interests. Nevertheless, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
stressed that ‘the dignity of a human being lies in its very existence’ and that it applies to 
prenatal life as well as life extant.83  The significance of the second factor should not be 
overlooked – whilst the state has a duty to respect and protect the dignity of the foetus, it is 
                                                 
75 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 252. 
76 H. Dreier, ‘Menschenwürdegarantie und Schwangerschaftsabbruch’ (1995) 24 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 
1036, at 1037. 
77 J. Ipsen, ‘Der „verfassungsrechtliche Status“ des Embryos in vitro: Anmerkungen zu einer aktuellen Debatte’ 
(2001) Juristen Zeitung 989, at 992 f.. 
78 The right to life may be infringed pursuant to statute, Art. 2 III GG. 
79 H. Dreier, in H. Dreier (note 58), Art. 1 I, Rn. 44, but cf. M. Baldus, ‚Menschenwürdegarantie und 
Absolutheitsthese Zwischenbericht zu einer zukunftsweisenden Debatte’ (2011) 134(4) Archiv des öffentlichen 
Rechts 529. 
80 See also H. Dreier Bioethik: Politik und Verfassung, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013, at 25; J. Isensee, 
‘Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach dem Absoluten’ (2006) 131(2) Archiv des 
öffentlichen Rechts 173, at 194. 
81 See also M. Herdegen, in T. Maunz / G. Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, München: C.H.Beck, 70. 
Ergänzungslieferung, 2013, Art. 1 I  Rn. 112. 
82 See also U. Steiner, Der Schutz des Lebens durch das Grundgesetz, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991, at 13.  
83 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 267, my emphasis. 
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equally obliged to respect and protect the woman’s dignity and not to treat her as a mere 
uterine environment.  Therefore, in the second abortion decision the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that the woman’s dignity and liberty interests must also 
be protected, necessitating a a proportionate solution that sufficiently protects foetal life, 
without disproportionally restricting the woman’s right to self-determination.84  
 
In the first decision the majority held that the minimum level of protection required for the 
foetus could only be provided by the use of the criminal law, whilst the dissenting judges 
argued that better alternatives to criminal sanctions exist and would be more likely to 
persuade her to continue the pregnancy, thereby affording the foetus greater protection.85  
One of the significant shifts between the first and second decisions is that the majority in the 
latter accepted this argument, moving from a duty to protect the foetus that categorised the 
woman as an aggressor, to a conception that framed her as a collaborator, as someone whose 
cooperation is essential in safeguarding the foetus.86  Consistent with its first decision, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that abortion may be justified in circumstances where it 
would be unreasonable to impose a duty to continue the pregnancy, for example where a 
medical, criminological or embryopathic indication would justify termination.  However, it 
also held that absent a justificatory indication, a woman could elect to terminate the 
pregnancy throughout the first trimester, provided that she underwent counselling designed to 
encourage women to continue their pregnancies.   Thus the court found that the state could 
provide the requisite minimum of protection of foetal life by requiring that the woman 
undergo pro-life counselling, by providing support (such as child care facilities) for bringing 
up children, and by continuing to designate non-justified abortion as unlawful (but not 
punishable) throughout pregnancy. In relation to the woman’s rights, the court found that 
such counselling (which would not require the counsellor to approve the woman’s reasons for 
wanting a termination) would comply with the duty to respect the woman’s dignity.87   
 
The counselling now enshrined in § 219 StGB forms an integral part of the protection of 
foetal life and is compulsory in the case of all abortions that cannot be justified by either the 
medical or the criminological indication (§ 218a II, III StGB).88 Designated as ‘pregnancy 
conflict counselling’ the normative goal of the counselling is to encourage women to 
continue their pregnancy.  The quid pro quo is that a woman can exercise her right to self-
determination and elect an abortion without requiring the approval of any other individual 
(including a doctor) within twelve weeks, provided that she undergoes the mandatory 
counselling and at least three days pass between the counselling and the performance of the 
abortion, (§ 218a I StGB).  The counselling is designed to assist her to reach a ‘responsible 
and conscientious’ decision about terminating the pregnancy.  Clearly the imposition of such 
a requirement treats women as less able to make a responsible decision without external 
assistance and there would appear to be little dignity in being forced to undergo compulsory 
pro-life counselling, to be told that the foetus has a right to life and that if you have a 
termination you will act unlawfully, but will not be punished.  As Mahrenholz and Sommer 
JJ (dissenting) pointed out, the label ‘unlawful’ contributes nothing to the state’s protection of 
                                                 
84 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 254 ff. 
85 BVerfGE 39, 1, at 79. 
86 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 266. 
87 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 265ff.  
88 The court did recognise that an embryopathically indicated abortion could be justified, but that indication has 
been subsumed within the medical indication, § 218a II StGB by taking account of the woman’s current and 
future circumstances. 
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unborn life.89The stigma of abortion remains, women are labelled lawbreakers, and the 
practical impact is that the direct costs of the counselling based abortion will not be covered 
by healthcare insurance, although the states are required to fund abortions where the woman’s 
income falls below a certain level.90 Nevertheless, provided women jump through the 
counselling hoop they are able to elect an abortion without having to gain a third party’s 
approval, in direct contrast to the regulation of abortion in England and Wales, where the 
doctor plays the role of gatekeeper, determining when an abortion is permissible within the 
terms of the Abortion Act 1967, and women have no more than the ability to request an 
abortion. 
 
B: Who decides? 
By focusing upon dignity, the question of who decides to terminate a pregnancy can be 
framed in terms of personal choice, as an inherently private matter.  However, framing 
abortion in such a manner would necessitate a break with the underlying philosophy of the 
Abortion Act 1967, namely that women are incapable of making a decision to terminate a 
pregnancy without the guiding hand of a responsible, professional, a registered medical 
practitioner.  Indeed, one of the aspects of the regulation of abortion in England and Wales 
that sets it apart from that adopted in the majority of Europe and the U.S.A. is the medicalised 
model of abortion that continues to dominate the legislative landscape.  In this section I 
outline the manner in which the Abortion Act 1967 conceptualises the role of medical 
professionals in determining the legitimacy of abortion on a case by case basis, whilst 
rejecting the moral agency of women to make the decision to terminate, rather than continue, 
a pregnancy.  Thereafter I focus upon the shift in the debate that has occurred that, whilst 
continuing to stress the vulnerability of women, now portrays her as in need of protection 
from, rather than by, the doctor.  Finally I consider one of the proposed ‘women protective’ 
amendments, the introduction of a requirement that all women seeking an abortion be offered 
independent counselling, and then draw upon the German law to suggest a way in which 
abortion can be framed as a matter for personal choice (respecting the woman’s dignity and 
self-determination), whilst protecting the dignity of foetal life, through the use of counselling. 
 
1. Framing abortion as a matter of medical opinion 
Passed at a time of great social change that saw suicide decriminalised by the Suicide Act 
1962 and homosexual acts in private between men over the age of 21 decriminalised by the 
Sexual Offences Act 1967, the Abortion Act 1967 was not a great liberalising measure.  It 
failed to empower women to elect to terminate a pregnancy at any time during the pregnancy, 
instead framing abortion as a medical matter and prioritising medical opinion.    The Act built 
upon the common law in emphasising that only registered medical practitioners are capable 
of performing a lawful abortion, and indeed of agreeing that an abortion would be legitimate 
in the circumstances.  In R v Bourne Macnaughten J distinguished between the respectable 
medical professional, a skilled man, performing an abortion free of charge and in the belief 
that ‘he ought, in the performance of his duty as a member of a profession devoted to the 
alleviation of human suffering, to do it,’ and the abortionist, ‘a woman without any medical 
                                                 
89 BVerfGE 88, 203, at 348. 
90 The level is set on an annual basis, for example, in 2015 a woman would not be expected to pay for a 
counselling based abortion if her net monthly income was less than 1,075 €, with additional allowances of 254 € 
per child (so that a woman with 2 children would qualify for financial assistance if her income were less than 
1583 €) and for rents of over 351 €; additionally certain groups will automatically qualify for financial 
assistance, including recipients of unemployment benefit, a vocational training award, or asylum seekers benefit, 
see § 19 SchKG. Indicated abortions will be covered by statutory health insurance. 
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skill or medical qualifications’ who performed the same act for money.91  Moreover, he 
stressed that the woman, a 16 year old rape victim, was ‘a normal, decent girl brought up in a 
normal, decent way,’ rather than someone who was feebleminded or had a ‘prostitute 
mind.’92  As Sally Sheldon has demonstrated the construction of women seeking abortion 
played a significant role in the parliamentary debates where three images of femininity can be 
observed – the woman as minor, victim and mother.93  Within the debates women who wish 
to terminate their pregnancies are clearly portrayed as aberrant, as failing to fulfil their 
potential and their natural role; as Sheldon argues, they were classed either as the 
‘emotionally weak, unstable (even suicidal) victim of her desperate social circumstances,’ or 
a ‘selfish, irrational child.’94  By contrast, the registered medical practitioners were described 
in wholesome terms, being responsible, mature, professional men able to make dispassionate, 
objective decisions; experts able to consider the woman’s request for a termination and 
determine its legitimacy.   
 
The parliamentary debates that culminated in the enactment of the Abortion Act 1967 make it 
clear that the reforms were not intended to give women the right to elect an abortion, but 
rather to preserve clinical judgement, establishing doctors as the gatekeepers to lawful 
abortion.  As David Steel, the promoter of the Bill stated,  ‘We are leaving to the medical 
profession what members of that profession consider and have represented to us that they, 
and they alone, have every right and qualification to determine and that it is not for 
Parliament to tie their hands.’95 This view clearly reflects the conclusion of the British 
Medical Association’s Special Committee on therapeutic abortion that ‘the ultimate decision 
to advise termination of pregnancy rests with the doctors in charge of the case and, subject to 
the conditions laid down to safeguard the security of the pre-viable foetus, the law should not 
seek to influence this decision by further defining the degree of risk which must be present 
before termination can be regarded as lawful.’96  
 
A similar stance was adopted in Roe v Wade when the U.S Supreme Court held that during 
the first trimester, ‘the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical 
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.’97 Thus the right to elect an abortion 
protected by the right to privacy, as defined in Roe, consisted of a right to elect abortion in 
consultation with her doctor, rather than the woman’s right to elect an abortion per se.98  As 
Blackmun J stated ‘The abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a 
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.’99   In this way 
professional judgment was protected and prioritised.  On both sides of the Atlantic reform of 
the law relating to abortion occurred against the backdrop of recognising and preserving 
medical discretion in the decision-making process.  The result is that medical paradigms 
dominate the discourse at all levels – pregnancy is defined as a medical condition, abortion as 
a medical procedure, to be performed by a medical professional in a medical setting.  As 
Laura Woliver has pointed out,  
                                                 
91 [1939] 1 K.B. 687, at 689-690. 
92 Ibid at 694 - 5. 
93 S. Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law, London: Pluto Press, 1997, at 35. 
94 S. Sheldon ‘Who is the mother to make the judgment? The construction of woman in English abortion law.’ 
(1993) 1(1) Feminist Legal Studies 3, at 6. 
95 David Steel MP HC Deb 29 June 1967 vol 749, col 900. 
96 ‘Therapeutic abortion: Report by BMA Special Committee’ [1966] 2 British Medical Journal 40, at 44. 
97 Roe v Wade (note 57), at 164. 
98 See also R.B. Siegel ‘Dignity and sexuality: Claims on dignity in transnational debates over abortion and 
same-sex marriage’ (2012) 10 (2) I.Con 355, at 361. 
99 Roe v Wade (note 57), at 166. 
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The naturalness of pregnancy and childbirth has been transformed into an illness, an 
unnatural condition, with an assumption of risk to fetal and maternal health that only 
the medical profession can rectify and control.  Shifting control from the pregnant 
woman to doctors and other medical professionals brings with it increased power of 
‘experts’ at the expense of women.  Experts define social issues in the arcane 
language of their professions, limiting the terms of debate and popular 
involvement.100  
Undoubtedly medical expertise is desirable in relation to the performance of an abortion, but 
by framing abortion as a medical matter the law also makes the decision as to whether or not 
an abortion is permissible a matter for doctors, ignoring the broader social context in which 
such decisions are made.  The impact of medical approval is particularly clear in the current 
German law whereby the applicability of both the medical and criminological indications (§ 
218a II, III StGB) fall to be determined by a doctor and will result in the abortion being 
classified as ‘not unlawful,’ whilst abortions based upon counselling (rather than an 
independent verification of the justifiable nature of the abortion by a doctor) are classified as 
unlawful, but not punishable.101  
 
As Ellie Lee points out, access to abortion is easy in England and Wales, but that is the result 
of the ways in which doctors interpret the law, rather than a recognition of the woman’s right 
to elect an abortion, even during the very early stages of pregnancy.102 As Hale LJ has so 
clearly stated ‘The availability of legal abortion depends upon the opinions of others.’103   
Thus, the law as framed by the Abortion Act 1967 depends upon the professional integrity of 
the medical profession, it does not, for example, permit abortion in the case of rape,104 rather 
the broadly drafted medico-social indication permits an abortion to be performed where two 
doctors form the opinion in good faith that it would be safer for the woman’s physical, or 
mental health, for the pregnancy to be terminated than if she were to continue the 
pregnancy.105  Clearly, the fact that she is pregnant as a result of rape is a relevant factor in 
determining the risk to the woman’s mental or physical health, but that calculation is left to 
doctors.  In this way, the Abortion Act 1967 prioritises medical opinion, rather than the 
woman’s wishes; at no stage in the parliamentary debates during the 1960s was there any 
recognition that a woman should be permitted to exercise her autonomy, to elect an abortion, 
a view that persisted when the Abortion Act 1967 was amended in 1990 by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act.  By contrast, just 2 years later in Casey, the U.S Supreme 
Court recognised that a woman’s right to autonomy and dignity, together with her right to 
equality, required that she be able to elect a pre-viability abortion.106  Despite referring to 
                                                 
100 L.R. Woliver, The Political Geographies of Pregnancy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002, at 30. 
101 § 218a I StGB. 
102 E. Lee ‘Reinventing abortion as a social problem: “Postabortion syndrome” in the United States and Britain’ 
in J. Best (ed) How claims spread: cross-national diffusion of social problems, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
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103 Parkinson v St James & Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266, [2001] EWCA Civ 530, at 
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104 Cf the second indication set out in the German Penal Code: § 218a III StGB  [The termination of pregnancy 
carried out by a doctor with the consent of the pregnant woman is not unlawful] ‘in the case of a termination of 
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105 S. 1(1)(a) Abortion Act 1967. 
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upholding and reaffirming the ‘essential’ holding of Roe, the court stressed the woman’s right 
to choose a pre-viability abortion, rather than her need to cooperate with her doctor.107   
 
Thus a significant shift in terms of recognising a woman’s decisional capacity and her role 
within society occurred in Casey. Similarly, in its second abortion decision the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht clearly distanced itself from its earlier stance regarding maternal 
duties.  In its first decision the court spoke of motherhood as a woman’s natural role, clearly 
viewing those seeking an abortion as aberrant ‘because they are not willing to accept the 
accompanying sacrifices [of pregnancy] and the natural maternal duties.’108 That a woman 
should have a duty to continue a pregnancy to term was regarded self-evident, whilst the 
state’s duty to protect foetal life required it to attempt to reawaken the maternal protective 
instinct that all women were considered to have.109   Such a view of women and their role 
both on their own terms, but also within society, stood in stark contrast to that propounded in 
the German Democratic Republic where early abortion was freely available, lawful and 
without charge from 1972, three years before the Bundesverfassungsgericht delivered its first 
decision.  The preamble to the GDR’s Act Relating to the Interruption of Pregnancy 1972 
emphasised that access to abortion is an integral part of women’s equality and that the 
responsibility for the decision whether to continue a pregnancy or not must rest with the 
woman concerned, stating: ‘The equality of women in education and career, marriage and 
family requires that the woman can decide herself about whether to continue a pregnancy to 
term.’110   
 
Following Germany unification the German legislature was charged with introducing uniform 
criminal law provisions regulating abortion to replace those that existed in East and West 
Germany, whilst guaranteeing the protection of foetal life to a greater extent than was the 
case in either part of Germany.111 The resultant legislation, the Schwangeren-und 
Familienhilfegesetz (SFHG)112 formed the focus of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s second 
abortion decision.113 The court adopted a rather more enlightened view of the role of women 
and stressed that the woman and the foetus should not be framed as adversaries, but rather 
that the state should view the woman herself as a source of protection for the foetus and 
attempt to persuade her to continue the pregnancy.  Although the court did not go so far as 
the U.S. Supreme Court in holding that the pregnant woman’s right to self-determination will 
encompass a right to elect a pre-viability abortion, in a significant change the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised that she could opt for an abortion within the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy without requiring the legitimising effect of a doctor’s approval.  
The quid pro quo was that she would have to undergo compulsory pro-life counselling at 
least three days before the procedure.  Whilst counselling–based abortions continue to bear 
the label ‘unlawful’, neither the woman, nor the doctor will incur criminal liability.  By 
contrast, the Abortion Act 1967 continues to require the signature of two doctors, certifying 
in good faith that one of the indications set out in s. 1(1) is fulfilled in order for those 
involved to be exempt from liability for procuring a miscarriage under ss.58, 59 Offences 
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Against the Persons Act 1861.  As the Science and Technology Committee found, this 
requirement does not ‘safeguard women or doctors in any meaningful way, or [serve] any 
other useful purpose.’114  It recommended the removal of the requirement, yet almost ten 
years later it persists, more than twenty years after the Supreme Court recognised the moral 
agency of women in America, emphasising the pregnant woman’s right to autonomy and 
dignity, rather than the need for her to cooperate with a doctor.  This requirement for medical 
approval continues to set England and Wales apart from the U.S.A and most of Europe and is 
particularly surprising given the increased debate about the need to protect women from 
doctors in the context of abortion.  
 
2. The demonization of medical professionals and calls for women-protective 
measures 
As Sally Sheldon has convincingly argued, abortion lost its high political profile in England 
and Wales due to the fact that regulation ‘has increasingly shifted from the political realm 
into the private sphere, where it has been constructed as a matter for the discretion of the 
medical profession.  This recodification as a technical problem to be discussed by experts … 
has defused the most fierce debates around abortion and has militated against any attempt to 
radically reform the law.’115  Thus framing abortion as a medical issue has avoided the 
politically charged debate about abortion that dominates American politics and judicial 
appointments.  However, more recently the trust in doctors that underpinned the 
parliamentary debates appears to have waned; doctors (or at least those who perform 
abortions) are no longer characterised as a safe pair of hands and increasingly calls are being 
made on both sides of the Atlantic for women to have a ‘right to know,’ suggesting that 
doctors conceal information about abortion, taking advantage of, rather than protecting, 
vulnerable women.  For example, in Gonzales v Carhart the U.S Supreme Court referred to 
‘abortion doctors’ (rather than simply doctors, or even gynaecologists) in holding that ‘The 
law need not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical 
practice,’116 a marked change in attitude from that prevailing in Roe v Wade where the court 
stressed the importance of maintaining professional autonomy.117 Similarly derogatory 
references can be found in the debates accompanying the more recent proposed amendments 
to the law regulating abortion in England and Wales.  For example, Nadine Dorries MP has 
argued that the National Institute for Clinical Excellence should draw up guidance relating to 
abortion, rather than the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists on the basis that 
RCOG members are ‘all abortionists.  They earn their livings from abortions.’118   
 
The parliamentary debates that accompanied the Abortion Act 1967 characterised women as 
vulnerable and in need of support, with doctors portrayed as the source of that support and 
the people best able to take a dispassionate, responsible view of the situation in determining 
whether abortion is the appropriate solution in the circumstances.  More recently however, 
anti-choice actors have sought to problematise abortion, subverting the arguments used to 
permit abortion by emphasising women’s vulnerability not as a reason to permit abortion, but 
rather as a need to intervene to protect women from predatory doctors who think only of the 
profit to be made from abortion.  Thus the Abortion Act 1967 has been the subject of attack 
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on a number of occasions, with campaigners attempting to amend the Act by restricting 
access to abortion in the name of protecting women.  Whilst many of these amendments have 
continued to stress the vulnerability of women seeking an abortion, the language relating to 
the doctor has changed, characterising ‘him’ as a scheming abortionist seeking to perform as 
many abortions as possible.119 This was particularly clear in the Dorries/Fields’ amendment 
to the Health and Social Care (HSC) Bill that would have required all women to be offered 
advice, information or counselling services by an independent body, defined as a body that 
does not provide, or have a financial interest in the provision of abortion, or a statutory body.  
The effect of this would have been to bar the registered charities (primarily Marie Stopes and 
the British Pregnancy Advisory Service) that perform a large proportion of abortions in 
England and Wales from providing these services.120  Throughout the debate Dorries argued 
that it is essential that the counselling is not provided by the abortion provider, arguing  
If anybody in this House were to take out a mortgage today, the person who sold them 
the mortgage would have to refer them elsewhere for independent advice. … I wonder 
why we feel it is appropriate that organisations that take £60 million a year of 
taxpayers’ money and are paid to carry out abortions give advice on the procedure. … 
If an organisation is paid that much for abortions, where is the incentive to reduce 
them?121 
It is suggested that there is a significant difference between the purchase of a financial 
product (often the source of commission for the seller) and consent to a medical procedure, 
performed free at the point of delivery, at the request of the woman.  As Diane Abbott so 
incisively quipped, ‘They imply that those men and women are involved in some sort of 
grotesque piecework. It is almost as though they were paid per abortion.’122  Whilst this was a 
clear attempt to undermine trust in the medical profession, it is suggested that this is not 
merely a reflection of the less elevated position occupied by doctors in society during the 
twenty-first century, but rather that terms such as ‘abortionist’, applied to medical 
professionals, rather than back street operators as in Bourne, are being used in order to 
reclaim the political and moral aspects of the abortion decision, to argue that the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy cannot be left to doctors to determine in good faith without a 
significantly greater degree of external control.  Noticeably those seeking to amend the law 
did not suggest that a woman should be able to decide to terminate a pregnancy without 
medical approval, they merely argued that she should be offered ‘independent’ counselling.   
 
A similar motivation to rein in doctors can be seen to underlie Fiona Bruce MP’s amendment 
to the Serious Crime Bill 2015.  As a result of a sting operation in 2012 by the Daily 
Telegraph,123 the Crown Prosecution Service were asked to consider bringing criminal 
charges against two doctors who appeared to have been willing to authorise an abortion on 
the basis of gender.  The woman involved was eight weeks pregnant and presented claiming 
to have had a test that showed she was having a girl and to have previously had a foetal loss 
at 22 weeks due to chromosomal abnormality.  Reacting to the sting operation the then 
Secretary of State for Health, Andrew Lansley wrote a piece entitled ‘Health professionals 
must not think they know better than the law’ and stated ‘Carrying out an abortion on the 
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grounds of gender alone is in my view morally repugnant. It is also illegal.’124  However, the 
CPS decided to take no further action and the Director of Public Prosecutions published fuller 
reasons for the decision not to prosecute.  Keir Stamer pointed out that ‘the law does not, in 
terms, expressly prohibit gender-specific abortions; rather, it prohibits any abortion carried 
out without two medical practitioners having formed a view, in good faith, that the health 
risks (mental or physical) of continuance outweigh those of termination. This gives a wide 
discretion to doctors in assessing the health risks of a pregnant patient.’125  Similarly the 
British Medical Association’s Handbook of Ethics and Laws stresses that ‘it is normally 
unethical to terminate a pregnancy on the grounds of fetal sex alone, except in cases of severe 
sex-linked disorders. … [However] in some circumstances doctors may come to the 
conclusion that [the effect of the sex of the fetus on the woman’s situation and on her existing 
children] are so severe as to provide legal and ethical justification for a termination.’126  
 
In 2014 the Department of Health issued guidance emphasising that ‘Abortion on the grounds 
of gender alone is illegal,’127 but Fiona Bruce MP felt that an explicit prohibition of sex-
selective abortion was necessary and proposed a Ten Minute Bill, followed by an amendment 
to the Serious Crime Bill 2015 to achieve such clarity.  She specifically addressed the need 
for the amendment in order to ensure that doctors did not continue to break the law, because 
‘abortion providers and others, staggeringly, are still refusing to accept the Government’s 
interpretation of the law.’128 Nevertheless, when questioned upon whether the amendment 
would preclude terminations for sex-linked conditions, Bruce argued that ‘We can trust our 
medical professionals in that respect.  … The ground for the abortion in such cases would be 
the genetic condition and not the sex of the child.’129  
 
Whilst the anti-choice movement traditionally speak in terms of protecting the foetus, a 
perceptible shift in the contours of the debate has occurred, as Reva Siegel argues, the 
justifications advanced for restricting abortion have moved from focusing upon the foetus, to 
gender-based justifications.130   The amendments to the Abortion Act 1967 proposed in recent 
years, including the introduction of an offer of independent counselling and the prohibition of 
gender based abortion, are part of the so-called ‘neglected rhetorical strategy’ (NRS) 
promoted by anti-choice activists such as David Reardon.  This strategy is based upon the 
argument that anti-choice campaigns should focus not merely on protecting the foetus, but 
also the woman, indeed Reardon characterises his stance as ‘pro-woman / pro-life,’ arguing: 
For the purpose of passing restrictive laws to protect women from unwanted and/or 
dangerous abortions, it does not matter if people have a pro-life view. The ambivalent 
majority of people who are willing to tolerate abortion in ‘some cases’ are very likely 
to support informed consent legislation and abortion clinic regulations, for example, 
because these proposals are  consistent with their desire to protect women. In some 
cases, it is not even necessary to convince people of abortion’s dangers. It is sufficient 
to simply raise enough doubts about abortion that they will refuse to actively oppose 
the proposed anti-abortion initiative. … Converting these people to a pro-life view, 
where they respect life rather than simply fear abortion, is a second step… but it is not 
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necessary to the accomplishment of other good goals, such as the passage of laws that 
protect women from dangerous abortions and thereby dramatically reduce abortion 
rates.131 
 
As Reardon makes clear, such amendments are not intended to prohibit abortion, they are 
incrementalist in nature and intended to restrict access to abortion, to make it harder, and 
particularly in the U.S context more expensive, to obtain.  Noticeably advocates of such 
policies have adopted the rhetoric of choice; they build on earlier narratives accepting that 
women are in need of protection, speaking of empowering women to make an informed 
choice and about ensuring that women are not coerced into having an abortion.  Women 
protective regulation has come to dominate the abortion landscape in the United States of 
America and has proved a particularly effective means of limiting access to abortion, but as 
Jennifer Hendricks argues, these arguments focussing upon the need to protect women ‘are 
based on traditional, paternalistic views that women should be protected from poor decisions, 
or from coercion, by eliminating their choices rather than informing and empowering their 
decisions.’132  The regulatory and political landscape in the United States of America is very 
different to that in England and Wales, but the notion of a woman’s right to know has also 
become a feature of the debates at Westminster. The recent proposed amendments to the 
Abortion Act 1967 can be seen to be part of the anti-choice agenda, to attack boundary issues 
in the name of protecting women and promoting gender equality, in order to reduce the 
availability of abortion incrementally.     
Fiona Bruce MP’s proposal that an explicit prohibition of sex-selective abortion be enacted 
was presented as a feminist amendment, an amendment necessary to give effect to equality, 
to protect women and female foetuses from abuse.133  The dominant narratives found in the 
parliamentary debate of the proposed amendment are those stressing the vulnerability of 
women, the need to protect women from coercion to abort and the emphasis of ‘otherness’ – 
the problem of ‘gendercide’ was portrayed not as an English problem, rather it was a problem 
affecting women from Southern Asia living in England and Wales.  Bruce called sex 
selective abortion ‘a gross form of sex discrimination… the first and most fundamental form 
of violence against women and girls,’ and suggested that nobody could object to banning 
such a practice.134  She argued that women were suffering because of the lack of clarity in the 
law, and provided anecdotal evidence of women being forced to have an abortion to avoid 
giving birth to girl, or women who had been subjected to abuse after delivering a girl,135 but 
none of the reports have been substantiated and it is difficult to see how the enactment of her 
amendment (criminalising sex selective abortions) would have helped to safeguard the 
women upon whom she focussed from abuse.  As the Southall Black Sisters argued, the 
protection of women should be addressed by a safeguarding, not a criminal framework, and 
this practice needs to be considered within the broader context of gender discrimination, 
including domestic violence and honour based violence.136 Similarly, Sally Sheldon has 
argued, if anything the cases referred to ‘illustrate that fully respecting women’s autonomy in 
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this context requires not just robust consent procedures but also active commitment to 
securing the best possible conditions within which reproductive choice may be exercised.’137  
Notwithstanding the debate generated by this issue, it is questionable to what extent sex 
selective abortion occurs in England and Wales.  Although Bruce’s amendment was defeated, 
an amendment was passed requiring the Secretary of State for Health to arrange for an 
assessment of the evidence of termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the 
foetus in England, Wales and Scotland.138 The findings were published in August 2015, 
confirming early Department of Health statistical reports in finding that there is no systemic 
evidence for sex selective abortion.139   
Nadine Dorries’ proposal that doctors be obliged to offer women seeking abortion 
independent counselling gained significantly more traction and was similarly based upon 
both protecting and empowering women.  Addressing the need for such counselling she 
wrote: 
Doesn’t every woman have a right to know that the risk of pre-term delivery is 
increased in further pregnancy following an abortion? Doesn’t she have a right to 
know the statistics regarding metal health issues post abortion? Are women seeking 
an abortion not entitled to be treated in the same way as they would be if they were 
seeking any other type of operation? Should their consent not be fully informed? 
…The fact is that I am pro-woman. I strongly object to the pro-choice mantra of the 
1980s which as the advocate of a streamlined, conveyor belt, factory efficient, 
abortion process is now doing so much to damage so many women.140 
This statement echoes the rhetoric underlying the informed consent provisions that have been 
introduced at state level in much of the USA.  That a woman should give her informed 
consent to abortion sounds eminently reasonable, it is of course a legal requirement that she 
does so and treatment provided without a sufficiently informed consent will constitute a 
trespass against the person.  However, the content of informed consent in the abortion context 
is hotly contested, as is counselling as the vehicle for achieving such consent.  Moreover, the 
demand for counselling and enhanced duties to inform can be seen to be part of the 
‘awfulisation’ of abortion, constructing abortion as crisis and counselling as a crisis 
intervention to protect vulnerable women,141 or as a necessary measure to enable women to 
make a responsible decision. 
3. Counselling as a tool to ensure the woman’s informed consent or equip her to 
make a responsible decision 
There is nothing innovative in the proposal that women seeking abortion should have access 
to counselling, more than forty years ago the Lane Committee recommended: 
A woman considering abortion should be able to discuss and explore her difficulties 
in an informal and unhurried manner.  She should be told the nature of the operation 
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(risks and alternatives).  She should thus become more fully aware of the implications 
of the continuation, or alternatively the termination of her pregnancy and be helped to 
arrive at a wise and independent decision as to what her real wishes are.142 
 
However, the meaning of abortion counselling is contested.143  As Sam Rowlands has 
documented, in the abortion context there is a distinction between the provision of 
information and decision counselling, where counselling engages primarily with the 
psychological and emotional aspects of the decision to continue the pregnancy or abort.144  
The former is clearly linked to the ability to give an informed consent and will require the 
healthcare professional to provide information about the procedure and any material risks, as 
well as satisfying herself that the woman has the capacity to consent to a termination and is 
doing so voluntarily.  Decision counselling is very different in nature; it is available in 
England and Wales, however it is not routinely offered to women.  Instead women are 
offered counselling upon request, or where the doctor believes that the woman requires 
additional support, for example where she is young, or where there is evidence of coercion.  
As previously mentioned, the Dorries/Fields amendment to the Health and Social Care Bill 
2011 sought to introduce a requirement that all women be offered advice, information or 
counselling services by an independent body, thus excluding the largest providers of abortion 
in England and Wales from offering this service.145 If a woman were required to go to 
another body for counselling, information and advice, as proposed, there would inevitably be 
further delay in accessing abortion, despite the policy consideration that early access to 
abortion should be achieved wherever possible.146  Moreover, there is a need to ensure that 
information provided is accurate and evidence-based and not be intended to pressurise 
women into continuing the pregnancy; this would clearly be a cause for concern if women 
were to be offered counselling by a crisis pregnancy centre for example.147  No evidence was 
put forward to suggest that there was a problem in the way that counselling was being 
provided during the parliamentary debate and in 2013 the Department of Health reported that 
the independent providers do offer counselling to all women, but that access is patchier in 
NHS hospitals with no counselling being available at all in some cases.148  Thus, as in the 
case of Fiona Bruce’s proposal, this would appear a rather contrived debate, proposing a 
solution to address a problem that does not seem to exist.149 
 
The notion that women should be put in the position to give a fully informed consent to 
abortion requires greater consideration.  During the course of the debate it was never made 
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clear how advice, information and counselling services were to be distinguished from one 
another and Dorries appeared to conflate the three elements in talking about the need to 
protect vulnerable women and to ensure that the decision made is fully informed, arguing that 
the current system fails women.150  Dorries has long campaigned for a woman’s ‘right to 
know,’ indeed in the draft minority report to the Science and Technology Committee’s 
Report on Scientific Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967  which she co-authored, 
it was stated that  
Given the evidence regarding upper limits and health complications for women, there 
should be new ‘right to know’ provisions so that women are given all the information 
they need about fetal development and pre-term birth.  Women should also be 
informed with regard to the conflicting expert opinions regarding a link to breast 
cancer and should be given time to consider the options available – in order to 
empower women and enable them to make a fully informed choice.151 
 
From this statement it is clear that she considers that an enhanced level of information will be 
required, over and above the standard requirement that doctors disclose all material risks.152  
The question of what will constitute full information in the abortion context is contested, 
however the informed consent paradigm has been adopted at state level in much of the United 
States of America.  In Casey, outlining its undue burden standard, the U.S. Supreme Court 
made it clear that the woman’s exercise of her autonomy is not unfettered, but may be 
‘guided’ by the state to ensure that a ‘responsible’ or ‘wise’ decision is made.153 In so 
deciding, as Susan Appleton argues, the joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter JJ 
‘validated a portrait of women as incompetent decision-makers, dependent on the state to 
orchestrate their deliberation and provide relevant information.’154 Since the Supreme Court’s 
volte-face155 women protective regulation has come to dominate the abortion landscape in the 
United States and has proved a particularly effective means of limiting access to abortion.  
Whilst there can be no doubt that a woman’s consent to any medical procedure should be 
fully informed, it is the recognition in Casey that abortion specific informed consent may be 
required that is a significant cause for concern.  The ‘right to know’ legislation that has been 
introduced in a number of states following Casey is not limited to evidence based risk 
assessments, instead duties to inform about manufactured risks, such as the risk of breast 
cancer and ‘post-abortion syndrome’ have been introduced in some states.  For example, 
there is no scientific link between breast cancer and abortion,156 but that has not prevented 
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some U.S. states, requiring that women be told there ‘may’ be a link between breast cancer 
and abortion.  Thus the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act 2003 requires that women 
seeking abortion be informed of ‘the possibility of increased risk of breast cancer following 
an induced abortion and the natural protective effect of a completed pregnancy in avoiding 
breast cancer.’157  Similarly there is no evidence to substantiate a link between abortion and 
mental illness,158 but in Gonzales v Carhart Kennedy J posited: 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has 
for her child. The [Partial Birth Abortion Ban] Act recognizes this reality as well. 
Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. … While 
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to 
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once 
created and sustained. .. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.159 
As Ginsburg J noted in her stinging dissent, in so doing the court invoked ‘an antiabortion 
shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence.’160  Nevertheless, despite ample 
evidence that such a link does not exist,161 a number of states require women to be told of the  
link between abortion and psychological harm, for example South Dakota requires a doctor to 
inform the woman seeking an abortion of ‘all known medical risks of the procedure and 
statistically significant risk factors to which the pregnant woman would be subjected, 
including: (i) Depression and related psychological distress; (ii) Increased risk of suicide 
ideation and suicide.’162  South Dakota is not alone in requiring that women are given 
inaccurate, or misleading information in this respect, but it is difficult to see how obliging 
doctors to provide such information can be compatible with obtaining informed consent.   
 
In Gonzales v Carhart Kennedy J explained that:  
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-
evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief 
more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, 
what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum 
the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.163 
 
Thus it would appear that informed consent has a rather different meaning in the abortion 
context to that applicable to other medical procedures, requiring more than an accurate 
understanding of the risks and merits of the proposed procedure.  Abortion exceptionalism, it 
would appear, requires that women are given additional guidance in order to equip them to 
make a responsible decision that they will not regret, a limitation that noticeably does not 
seem to apply to the decision to continue a pregnancy.  As Ginsburg J argued, ‘This way of 
thinking reflects ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the 
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.’164  The American experience 
clearly demonstrates the dangers of the informed consent paradigm in the abortion context.  It 
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has allowed the state to require healthcare professionals to give information that may not be 
accurate and in some cases is calculated to mislead, it has permitted the state to mandate 
medical procedures that serve no medical purpose, but that increase the cost of abortions, the 
time taken to access abortion, and subject women to varying degrees of invasiveness.  In all 
these cases the state can justify the requirements on the basis that it is protecting a woman’s 
right to full information and that it is recognising the dignity of life in ensuring that she 
makes a well informed decision. 
 
 
It is submitted that the level of information required to consent to an abortion should be the 
same as that required for any other medical procedure.  Clearly that will require that the 
doctor informs the woman of how the abortion will be performed, but it is suggested that the 
level of detail suggested by Kennedy J in Gonzales v Carhart would be unnecessary.165  Both 
the U.S Supreme Court and the Bundesverfassungsgericht have recognised that counselling 
need not be neutral, that the state can try to persuade a woman to continue the pregnancy, but 
information should be relevant and appropriate.  On that basis it is difficult to justify 
requirements that women undergo an ultrasound scan and be given a detailed description of 
the foetal dimensions, presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of external members and 
internal organs as required in Texas in all cases except where the woman was the victim of a 
sexual assault, a minor or the foetus is handicapped.166  The fact that women who have been 
raped are able to provide a voluntary and informed consent without such information would 
appear to confirm that the underlying purpose of such informed consent provisions is to 
stigmatise abortion and the women who exercise their right to elect a pre-viability abortion;  
to make access to abortion more difficult, more expensive, more time-consuming and more 
distressing, unless the woman is perceived to have a ‘good’ reason for seeking a termination.  
As Howard Minkoff has argued, ‘Performing an angiogram before the placement of a stent is 
clearly an appropriate preoperative procedure, but legislators have not passed statutes to 
mandate it, and there certainly would be no support for a requirement that patients view the 
screen before consenting to the procedure,’ the same principles should apply to informed 
consent in the abortion context. 
 
The woman should be informed of the alternatives (both in terms of different procedures, but 
also in terms of continuing the pregnancy and adoption) and of the risks that apply to the 
procedure, but reference to full information should not be seen as justifying a duty to inform 
of hypothetical risks, or provide misleading information. The anti-choice movement has 
dedicated significant time and resources to developing a bank of literature investigating 
whether there might be a link between abortion and breast cancer, as well as whether abortion 
is psychologically damaging.  Whilst both theories have been debunked at the highest levels, 
the continued re-researching of such links has produced a large body of literature that is 
‘premised on and perpetuates the pathologisation of abortion.’167  During her speech Dorries 
made repeated reference to a recently published article by Priscilla Coleman168 which claimed 
that the evidence ‘revealed a moderate to highly increased risk of mental health problems 
after abortion,’ a finding at odds with the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ conclusion that 
‘Where studies control for whether or not the pregnancy was planned or wanted, there is no 
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evidence of elevated risk of mental health problems.’169  Priscilla Coleman is a collaborator 
of David Reardon and her article has been widely discredited.170 There is no evidence of a 
causal link between abortion and mental health problems, indeed the Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges have advised ‘The rates of mental health problems for women with an 
unwanted pregnancy were the same whether they had an abortion or gave birth.’171  It is a 
source of deep concern that the sponsor of an amendment to require every woman be offered 
counselling by an independent body should accept such flawed research without question, 
even going so far as to dismiss the findings of the Royal College of Psychiatrists as 
outdated.172 
 
Much of Dorries’ arguments appear to relate to a need for counselling in the broader sense, 
involving a discussion of the woman’s feelings about abortion.  Clearly such counselling will 
be indicated where the woman is ambivalent about her decision, but research suggests that 
most women do not want decision counselling, that they have in fact already made their 
decision when the request an abortion.  In a recent study Charlotte Baron et al investigated 
the proportion of women presenting for a termination of pregnancy in Edinburgh who 
undergo pre-termination counselling and sought to evaluate their experience.  Although this 
is a relatively small scale study its findings are consistent with those of earlier studies.  The 
researchers found that only 9% of the women surveyed had undergone counselling and of 
those 18 women, 10 reported that the counselling had assisted them to make a decision.  85% 
of those who had not had counselling felt it was unnecessary because they were sure of their 
decision to have an abortion.173 
 
Counselling plays a pivotal role in enabling the German state to fulfil its duty to protect foetal 
life, it is the lynchpin of the current regulatory scheme and thus any woman who does not 
qualify for an abortion on the basis of either the medical, or the criminological indications 
will be required to undergo the mandatory counselling.174  As the primary vehicle for 
fulfilling the state’s duty to protect foetal life the counselling cannot be merely 
informative,175 thus the wording of § 219 StGB makes it very clear that the counselling is not 
neutral: ‘Counselling serves the protection of unborn life. It is to be led by the efforts to 
encourage the woman to continue the pregnancy and to show her perspectives for a life with 
the child; it should help her to make a responsible and conscientious decision…’   
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Tellingly, § 219 StGB bears the title ‘Counselling of the pregnant woman in a crisis or 
conflict situation,’ emphasising the aberrant nature of abortion and reinforcing the narrative 
of abortion as crisis. Nevertheless, one of the key shifts underpinning its second abortion 
decision was the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s recognition that the state could better protect 
the foetus by working together with the pregnant woman, rather than treating her as an 
adversary.176  This recognition underpins the counselling provision, both in terms of its 
rationale and the way in which counselling is made available to women.  The purpose of 
counselling is to persuade the woman to continue the pregnancy rather than to assess the 
validity of her choice, as the court argued, if the woman can make her own decision, without 
having to seek the approval of anyone else, she is more likely to make a responsible and 
conscientious decision177 and more likely to engage fully with counselling as she will not feel 
the need to demonstrate that she fulfils an abortion indication.178  Thus although the 
normative goal of the counselling is to persuade women to continue the pregnancy, the 
counselling is outcome neutral.  Whilst the court made it clear that a woman would be 
expected to share her reasons for seeking an abortion in order to enable the counsellor to 
more effectively support her in her decision-making,179 there is no legal obligation to do so.  
Provided that the woman attends the counselling, the counsellor must provide her with a 
certificate of counselling enabling her to access an ‘unlawful’, but non-punishable abortion 
after three days have passed.180  There is no scope for the counsellor to refuse to issue the 
certificate, or to delay issuing the certificate where that would preclude access to an abortion 
within the twelve week time limit.181 
 
In fulfilling its duty to protect foetal life the state must ensure that counselling is accessible 
and effective in providing both support and information to the woman, thus the counselling is 
provided free of charge and the states must ensure that women are able to access abortion 
counselling in a state approved counselling centre near where they live and without delay.182  
Counselling is provided by a variety of centres, ranging from religious based counselling 
centres to individual doctors, but centres must be approved by the state, must provide 
professional counselling and be able to work with other bodies providing support to women 
and children; they must also be economically and organisationally independent from abortion 
providers.183  Although the German form of abortion counselling is designed to encourage the 
woman to continue her pregnancy, it is very different in nature to that mandated by many of 
the abortion specific informed consent laws that have been introduced in the USA.  There is 
no requirement that the woman submit to an ultrasound and view the foetus, for example, nor 
does the state require that doctors provide scripted information to the pregnant women, 
regardless of whether that information is clinically relevant, or indeed accurate.  Crucially, 
the German counselling is not intended to inform a woman’s consent to abortion, rather it is 
intended to support her decision-making.  The counsellor may not be the doctor who 
performs the abortion and the counselling is entirely distinct from the provision of 
information relating to the abortion procedure and any risks involved, discussion of which 
falls to the treating doctor, §218 c II StGB.  Instead the focus of the counselling is upon 
looking at ways in which the woman might be able to come to terms with continuing the 
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pregnancy.  Thus the stress is laid upon supporting her and as the court emphasised, it is not 
enough to point out to the woman that support is available, instead the counsellor must 
proactively try to assist her to access support, whether that be financial aid, or housing 
assistance for example.184   
 
The counselling provision is central to the regulation of abortion in Germany, it permits 
women to make an autonomous decision, to elect an abortion within twelve weeks, without 
having to satisfy an indication, or convince another person that an abortion is permissible in 
the circumstances.  Admittedly there is little dignity in being required to undergo counselling 
in order to be put in a position to make a responsible and conscientious decision.  However, it 
is suggested that in fact the counselling is a minimally intrusive device that enables the 
woman to exercise her self-determination whilst simultaneously affording the foetus a 
(minimal) level of protection from implantation.  Whilst the counselling requirement does 
demonstrate respect for life, its ability to protect foetal life is necessarily limited.  Just as in 
other jurisdictions women will present for abortion having already made up their mind to 
have an abortion; there is no evidence to suggest that a significant number of women change 
their minds after counselling.185  Nevertheless, the fact that the counselling must be accurate 
and result neutral, that it must be designed to show the possibilities to continue the 
pregnancy, demonstrates respect for the dignity of foetal life, without undermining the 
woman’s dignity.  It is a compromise that seeks to respect human dignity conceptualised as 
both choice and life.  Neither conceptualisation is absolute, thus the woman’s dignity 
demands that she be able to elect an early abortion, but she must make that decision against 
the background of the impact it will have on the foetus.  Clearly an abortion will terminate 
the life of the foetus and therefore the state is entitled to demand that she takes account of that 
fact in making her decision and considering the alternatives.  By the same token, the state is 
under a duty to provide support for pregnant women and families.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, it is clear that access to early abortion is largely unproblematic in 
England and Wales, although that is the result of the liberal manner in which doctors interpret 
the Abortion Act 1967.  However, as Laura Woliver recognises ‘Much abortion jurisprudence 
is a story about doctors and fetuses instead of women’s lives, because the court often reasons 
about reproductive policies in physiological paradigms, framing regulation as state action 
concerning women’s bodies rather than women’s rights.’186  In this way abortion regulation is 
framed in terms of what others can do to the pregnant woman, rather than what she can 
choose for herself; she is objectified, depersonified and reduced to little more than an 
ambulatory reproductive facility.  The symbolic implications of medicalisation are extremely 
problematic – in England and Wales the law affords scant regard to the woman’s choices, 
with any decisions being left to professionals and decisions being made on narrow 
physiological grounds.   The American experience demonstrates that the risk of so-called 
‘women protective’ legislation is not that abortion will be prohibited, but that through various 
limitations and restrictions it will become inaccessible to more and more people.  Although 
the context in which abortion is provided is very different in England and Wales, with the 
majority of abortions and contraception being provided free at the point of delivery, recent 
legislative proposals have drawn upon the American experience, seeking to resolve problems 
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that simply do not exist in the English context by introducing incremental restrictions upon 
access to abortion in the name of protecting women. 
   
It is suggested that the time has come to recognise the agency of women in England and 
Wales, that they are capable of making reproductive decisions for themselves without the 
need for a doctor’s guiding hand.  The decision to terminate a pregnancy must be one of the 
most difficult decisions any woman has to make, but as an individual, a person who is more 
than her reproductive capacity, she must be permitted to make that decision on her own 
terms, even if she may later come to regret the decision.  The price of autonomy is that one 
must take responsibility for one’s own decisions, good and bad.  However, focussing upon a 
woman’s right to autonomy, or her right to bodily integrity, necessarily only considers one 
part of the whole.  The foetus that resides within her is not nothing, it is deserving of respect, 
and cannot simply be destroyed without further thought. In Vo v France the European Court 
of Human Rights once again considered the application of Art. 2 ECHR to the foetus.  
Although it failed to determine whether or not the foetus is a person for the purposes of the 
Art. 2 ECHR, the majority held that ‘The potentiality of [the foetus] and its capacity to 
become a person … require protection in the name of human dignity, without making it a 
“person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of Article 2.’187  Thus the court clearly 
anticipated that dignity could protect the foetus, and in doing so could restrict individual 
choice.   
 
The Abortion Act 1967 constructs women as patients seeking care, rather than as women 
choosing abortion.  By locating the regulation of abortion within a framework of respect for 
dignity, it is possible to prioritise choice so that the woman’s dignity, which necessarily 
includes respect for her autonomy and bodily integrity, is not subject to the whims of the 
medical profession.  In this article I have argued that the issue of abortion should be reframed 
as a matter of the protection of human dignity, rather than as a conflict between the woman’s 
right to autonomy and the life of the foetus. Drawing upon the German abortion 
jurisprudence I have suggested that dignity operates as a lens through which the woman’s 
claim to autonomy and the interest in foetal life are best viewed, enabling the conflicting 
interests to be reconciled and simultaneously protecting foetal life and the woman’s 
autonomy and bodily integrity.  The protection of human dignity does not require that these 
interests be given an equal degree of protection throughout pregnancy and thus it is argued 
that at least during the first trimester a lower level of protection is demanded in respect of the 
foetal life, whilst the woman’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity are given precedence.  
With increased gestation, dignity will require that the balance is adjusted, so that at the latest 
when the foetus becomes viable its life is prioritised over the woman’s autonomy, albeit with 
exceptions for risks to her health and life.   
 
No matter what stage of the pregnancy, a woman’s choice to terminate a pregnancy is not 
made in a vacuum, it is dependent upon the context in which she decides.  By emphasising 
the physiological process of pregnancy, the current focus of the law in England and Wales 
fails to take account of the social framework in which such choices are made. Although the 
German abortion decisions conceptualise abortion as a rights issue, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has framed the basic rights set out in the German constitution as 
communitarian, rather than individualistic, in focus, thus the individual is conceived as ‘an 
autonomous person who develops freely within the social community.’188  It is suggested that 
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this approach is correct; John Donne wrote, ‘no man is an island’ and respect for human 
dignity gives voice to this philosophy, it values the individual as a subject and not as a mere 
means to an end, but it also places the individual at the heart of the community.  Although the 
construction of dignity as empowerment will necessarily prioritise the woman’s values, it is 
suggested that dignity will impact upon the exercise of autonomy, requiring that the woman 
take account of the wider consequences of her choice.  That is not to say that her decisions 
should be restricted to those that will protect foetal life, but she must consider the foetus in 
making her decision.  The state has an interest in, and a duty towards, the foetus, a duty to 
ensure respect for the dignity of human life.  This does not mean that the preservation of 
foetal life must be maintained in all, or even most, circumstances, but it does require the 
foetus, as a living entity to be respected.  One means of demonstrating such respect is to 
require that the woman undergo non-directive counselling intended to accurately inform her 
choice prior to having an abortion. 
 
Abortion is a public health issue, it should not be a criminal matter and it is time that we 
move away from treating it as such.  The German solution is not perfect, it is regrettable that 
the majority of the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided that an abortion based upon the 
counselling provision must continue to be stigmatised as ‘unlawful’, however the manner in 
which counselling has been used in order to protect human dignity represents a useful 
benchmark to which we can look for inspiration. Respect for human dignity requires that the 
woman’s choice is informed, that she takes account of the foetus in making that choice, and 
that the state facilitates not only the making of the choice through information, but also 
ensures that there is a real choice to be made.  The choice is not merely to continue the 
pregnancy or not, her decision will continue to have an impact after birth, for the rest of the 
woman’s life.  Therefore, the context in which that choice will operate must be acknowledged 
and further support must be provided to women and families, for example by providing 
subsidised childcare, paid parental leave and more general support for families in the case of 
those who wish to continue the pregnancy and funded abortion for those who do not.  In 
balancing the woman’s interests with those of the foetus, it would appear fair to require that 
information be made available about alternatives to abortion, and even that she be asked to 
wait a few days to consider that information, provided that thereafter she is entitled to have 
an abortion without the need for two medical professionals to say that her choice can be 
justified by reference to an indication, and funded by the National Health Service.  In sum her 
dignity requires that her choice, and her ability to make that choice, be both facilitated and 
respected by the state. 
 
 
